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Abstract
Complementing representative democracywith direct-democratic instruments is perceived to boost levels of political trust.
This was why Finland in 2012 introduced an agenda initiative, which gives citizens the right to propose legislation and
thereby provides citizens a say between elections. However, it remains unclear whether involvement in such mechanisms
helps restore political trust and what factors shape developments in political trust during involvement. This article con-
tributes to this research agenda by examining how using the Finnish agenda initiative affected developments in political
trust. The study uses two surveys to determine developments in political trust: a four-wave panel survey (n = 809 − 1419)
and a cross-sectional survey (n = 481) where the perceived change method is used. The results suggest that using the
citizens’ initiative did not necessarily cause positive developments in political trust. Nevertheless, positive developments
in political trust occurred when users achieved their intended aim and/or the process was seen as fair, which shows that
direct-democratic instruments can increase levels of political trust under some circumstances.
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1. Introduction
Direct-democratic mechanisms give citizens the chance
to take part in political decision-making (Altman, 2011;
Qvortrup, 2013; Setälä & Schiller, 2012). Despite their
popularity, it remains unclear how involvement in these
affects developments in political trust (Bauer & Fatke,
2014; Kern, 2017), and critical voices maintain that
such mechanisms frequently fail to improve democracy
(Achen & Bartels, 2016; Blaug, 2002; Dyck, 2009; Ladner
& Fiechter, 2012; Voigt & Blume, 2015). Bauer and Fatke
(2014) note that people involved in direct-democratic in-
struments may experience negative developments in po-
litical trust because of their involvement even when the
availability has positive effects. To ascertain how being
active shapes developments in political trust, it is imper-
ative to use appropriate data and methods (Quintelier &
van Deth, 2014).
Furthermore, it remains unclear what factors shape
developments in political trust, especially whether it is
necessary to achieve the desired outcomes, or it suf-
fices that decisions are taken in an appropriate manner
(Christensen, Karjalainen, & Nurminen, 2015; Esaiasson,
Gilljam, & Persson, 2012; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989;
Ulbig, 2008).
This study contributes to this research agenda by ex-
amining how supporting citizens’ initiatives affected po-
litical trust in Finland, where a citizens’ initiative was in-
troduced in 2012. Citizens’ initiatives allow citizens to put
issues on the political agenda by collecting signatures in
support of a proposal (Schiller & Setälä, 2012, p. 1). A dis-
tinction is made between full-scale initiatives, where de-
cisions are made through a ballot vote, and agenda ini-
tiatives, where representative bodies make the final de-
cision (Schiller & Setälä, 2012, p. 1). The Finnish citizens’
initiative is an agenda initiative where the Finnish Parlia-
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ment takes the final decision on initiatives put forward
by citizens. It is debated whether agenda initiatives are a
type of direct democracy since they do not make citizens
the final decision-makers (Altman, 2011; Qvortrup, 2013;
Setälä & Schiller, 2012), and some scholars refer to them
as soft forms of direct democracy to avoid confusion
(Jäske, 2017). Agenda initiatives resemble parliamentary
e-petition systems (Lindner & Riehm, 2011), where citi-
zens also make proposals to parliament. However, since
agenda initiatives lead to formal legislative proposals
that are dealt with by parliamentary committees and re-
quires a formal decision by parliament, they provide citi-
zenswith stronger agenda-setting powers than e-petition
systems, where proposals can be dismissed without giv-
ing them serious consideration (Schiller & Setälä, 2012,
p. 6). Compared to referendums, which are rare in most
political systems, agenda initiatives offer citizens a contin-
uous say in political decision making, and the impact on
legislation may even exceed that of ostensibly stronger
mechanisms (Qvortrup, 2013, p. 71). Finally, such mech-
anismsmay have particularly important repercussions for
developments in political trust precisely because they
rely on interaction with elected representatives (Carman,
2010). There are therefore valid reasons to assess the im-
pact of agenda initiatives on political trust.
The hypotheses are examined with two surveys from
users of two websites central for the functioning of
the Finnish citizens’ initiative, which allow for explor-
ing developments in trust over time. The results show
that users experienced negative developments in polit-
ical trust, thereby casting doubts on the possibilities for
boosting political trust through direct democracy. Never-
theless, the effects were positive when users achieved
their goals, and/or the decision-making process was con-
sidered fair. Hence direct democratic involvement can
have positive effects under certain circumstances.
2. Direct-Democratic Involvement and Political Trust
Direct democracy has been flourishing worldwide in
recent decades (Altman, 2011; Qvortrup, 2013). How-
ever, the idea of sustaining democratic legitimacy by
increasing popular involvement has been questioned.
Achen and Bartels (2016, pp. 73–75)maintain that direct-
democratic instruments fail to deliver policies favoured
by a democratic majority, catering instead to the pref-
erences of organized interests. Furthermore, even when
majorities do prevail, it does not necessarily lead to bet-
ter policies (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 76). Such argu-
ments and several empirical studies (Dyck, 2009; Ladner
& Fiechter, 2012; Voigt & Blume, 2015) cast doubt on
whether direct democracy can help restore positive at-
titudes towards the political system.
Political trust is here defined as ‘a basic evaluative ori-
entation toward the government founded on how well
the government is operating according to people’s nor-
mative expectations’ (Hetherington, 1998, p. 791). Polit-
ical trust has following Easton (1965) been considered a
central element of political support (Dalton, 2004; Norris,
1999). According to Dalton (2004, pp. 23–25), political
trust in institutions and actors serve as indicators for af-
fective orientations that he considers equivalent to what
Easton labels diffuse support. Although some argue that
critical attitudes in the form of low political trust can be
beneficial for democracy (Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999),
many consider political trust necessary to achieve a stable
democratic system (Easton, 1965; Hetherington, 1998;
Marien & Hooghe, 2011). Regardless of what level of
trust is considered optimal for democracy, it is important
to examine how political trust develops through direct-
democratic involvement to understand how these partic-
ipatory mechanisms affect the viability of democracy.
The link between direct democracy and political trust
remains unclear as previous studies show conflicting re-
sults (Talpin, 2018, p. 409). It is a central idea of partici-
patory democracy that political involvement fosters pos-
itive developments in civic attitudes and skills (Barber,
1984; Pateman, 1970). There are valid reasons to expect
direct-democratic involvement to have a positive effect
on trust since it provides citizens with a rare possibility
to influence political decision-making, evenwhen the act
itself takes little effort. Empirically, Smith (2002) finds
that inhabitants in US states with ballot initiatives have
higher levels of political knowledge, while Gherghina
(2016) finds that countries with more direct-democratic
instruments have higher levels of regime support. Nev-
ertheless, being politically active can also be a frustrat-
ing experience that does not necessarily appeal to or-
dinary citizens (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Accord-
ingly, Dyck (2009) and Voigt and Blume (2015) both find
that direct-democratic involvement reduces levels of po-
litical trust and Ladner and Fiechter (2012) find that the
impact of direct democracy at the local level in Switzer-
land is negligible.
These conflicting results show the importance of
distinguishing between availability and usage of direct
democracy. In their study of direct democracy in Switzer-
land, Bauer and Fatke (2014) find that the availability
of direct democracy has positive consequences for po-
litical trust while usage has a negative association with
political trust. Although intriguing, the authors do not
explore the mechanism at the individual level and they
rely on cross-sectional data and therefore cannot firmly
establish causal linkages, as they also note. Most previ-
ous studies fail to determine developments in political
trust over time. This highlights the importance of using
appropriatemethods and datawhen seeking to establish
causal mechanisms for the link between political partici-
pation and attitudes, a point alsomade byQuintelier and
van Deth (2014) in their study of how being politically ac-
tive affects political attitudes.
Despite the conflicting results, the first hypothesis
aligns with the positive view and states that:
H1. Using the citizens’ initiative causes positive devel-
opments in political trust.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 173–186 174
However, involvement in itself may fail to generate posi-
tive developments in political trust (Ulbig, 2008). The en-
suing hypotheses therefore concern what factors shape
how involvement affects political trust. Here a current
debate involves the role of outcome versus process satis-
faction, where there is mixed empirical evidence on the
relative importance of these two factors (Arnesen, 2017;
Christensen et al., 2015; Esaiasson et al., 2012; Marien &
Kern, 2017; Tyler et al., 1989).
Previous studies show that there are consistent dif-
ferences in developments in trust depending onwhether
participants achieve their goals, since several studies
find a gap in satisfaction between electoral winners and
losers (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug,
2005; Curini, Jou, & Memoli, 2012) and policy satisfac-
tion to generate positive political attitudes (Easton, 1965;
Page, 1994). Budge (2012) considers it one of the pri-
mary benefits of direct-democratic instruments such as
citizens’ initiatives that they help ensure policy outcomes
that are in linewith the preferences of themedian citizen.
Marien and Kern (2017) also find that referendum voters
are more likely to experience positive developments in
political support when they get their preferred outcome.
The notion that outcomes matters also entails that in-
volvement through an agenda initiative, which is a soft
form of direct democracy where citizens are not the final
decision-makers, may cause negative developments in
political trust. As Blaug (2002) points out, critical activists
may well be disappointed with participatory institutions
that fail to help them achieve their goals. This suggests
that any positive developments in political trust only ma-
terialize when a citizens’ initiative is approved. Based on
this, the second hypothesis states that:
H2. Users who achieve their goal experience positive
developments in political trust.
Other studies suggest that users may accept not getting
their preferred outcomes as long as the results come
about through a decision-making process that is per-
ceived as fair (Carman, 2010; Christensen et al., 2015;
Esaiasson et al., 2012; Tyler et al., 1989). According to
this idea, users of the citizens’ initiative may experience
positive developments if they feel that their grievances
are given due concern by decision-makers. Participants
not only care about achieving certain policy goals, they
also care about broader objectives such as ensuring a
richer democratic dialogue that ensures that all decisions
are reached through open discussions and careful atten-
tion to the pros and cons of the decisions. When they
feel that this is the case, they are even willing to ac-
cept not getting their preferred outcome. The percep-
tion of procedural fairness may be even more important
for mechanisms such as the agenda initiative, where the
decision-making powers remain in the hands of parlia-
ment (Carman, 2010, p. 747). This also entails that par-
ticipation can have detrimental effects for civic attitudes
when participants feel that decision makers fail to take
their demands seriously (Ulbig, 2008). This suggests that
positive developments in political trust can occur when
participants feel that the decision on an initiative was
reached through a fair process. Based on this, the third
and final hypothesis is:
H3. Users who are satisfied with the decision-making
process experience positive developments in political
trust.
The following section outlines how the hypotheses are
examined.
3. Data and Variables
The Finnish citizens’ initiative was introduced in 2012.
According to the regulations, the organizers can submit
an initiative to the Finnish Parliament if it gathers sup-
port from at least 50,000 Finnish citizens. The represen-
tatives must then decide whether to accept the citizens’
initiative, possibly in an amended form, or reject it al-
together. The official website www.kansalaisaloite.fi fa-
cilitates the collection of signatures in support of pro-
posals by making it possible to collect signatures on-
line. Prior to the launch of this, an independent web-
site called Avoin Ministeriö (www.avoinminsterio.fi, En-
glish translation Open Ministry) aimed to crowdsource
citizens’ initiatives by allowing members to discuss the
contents of individual initiatives and facilitate the collec-
tion of signatures (Christensen et al., 2015). Avoin Min-
isteriö was instrumental in developing contents and pro-
moting four of the first initiatives where the Finnish par-
liament made decisions.
From the launch in 2012 until parliamentary elec-
tions in April 2015, citizens launched more than 300 ini-
tiatives that collected over one million signatures in sup-
port (Christensen, Jäske, Setälä, & Laitinen, 2017). Nine
of thesemanaged to collect the required 50,000 support-
ers within the stipulated time limit and Parliament de-
cided on six citizens’ initiatives during 2012–2015. Par-
liament rejected all but one of the initiatives; an initia-
tive tomakemarriage legislation gender neutral. Despite
the limited legislative impact, the citizens’ initiative is
a popular mechanism that is widely believed to have
improved Finnish democracy (Christensen et al., 2017,
p. 421). However, as Bauer and Fatke (2014) argue, even
when availability is beneficial, usage is not necessarily
connected to positive developments in attitudes.
3.1. Data
The data come from two surveys administered to users of
two different websites that facilitates the use of the cit-
izens’ initiative. The first survey consists of a four-wave
panel data collected 2013–2015 among users on Avoin
Ministeriö following decisions of Parliament on four ini-
tiatives. The first concerns the very first decision by Par-
liament on a citizens’ initiative, which involved a pro-
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posal to ban fur farming (Ban Fur Farming). The sec-
ond wave was conducted following the decision on an
initiative on copyright legislation (Copyright), while the
third wave measures attitudes following the decision on
an initiative to make marriage legislation gender neu-
tral (Gender neutral marriage legislation). This initiative
gathered more than 150,000 supporters and was the
first to be approved by Parliament. The fourth and fi-
nal wave took place after a rejection of an initiative to
make it voluntary to learn Swedish in Finnish elemen-
tary schools (Swedish). For the first wave, all users on
Avoin Ministeriö received an invitation to fill in the sur-
vey by email, which 2147 respondents did. For the follow-
ing three waves, invitations to fill in surveys were sent
by email to these 2147 respondents following the deci-
sion of Parliament on the initiative in question. To ensure
data quality, the dataset was subsequently restricted
to respondents who adequately filled in at least two
waves, meaning the number of included respondents in
the first panel was restricted to 1419 respondents. The
survey includes an overrepresentation of young males
with a university education living in the Helsinki area. At-
trition was present, but analysing the attrition pattern
with respect to the demographic and attitudinal vari-
ables of interest (age, gender, education, political inter-
est and social trust), ANOVA analyses show that the dif-
ferences were only significant when it comes to age (F(3,
4174) = 5.37, p < 0.001)), since respondents are older
in the last wave (mean 40.6, SE = 0.48) compared to the
first (mean 38.5, SE = 0.34, p < 0.001) and the second
(mean 38.5, SE = 0.39, p < 0.01) waves. Despite the de-
creasing number of respondents in the waves, it is not a
uniform dropout of respondents. The response patterns
show that about 1/3 filled in all four rounds, another
third filled in three rounds and the final third only filled
in two rounds (round 1 and one more). Hence, even if a
respondent did not fill in Wave 2, it is for example possi-
ble he or she did fill in Wave 3 and 4. This panel data is
used to test all three hypotheses.
The second survey is a cross-sectional survey of
users on www.kansalaisaloite.fi collected during April–
May 2016. The users were invited to fill in the survey
by clicking a banner on the site and 481 respondents
accepted to do so. This survey is valuable since it pro-
vides an alternative approach to discerning the impact
of using the citizens’ initiative over time. The survey in-
cludes measures that asks respondents to estimate the
amount and direction of change in political trust they un-
derwent because of their use of the citizens’ initiative in
linewith the perceived changemethod (Hill & Betz, 2005;
Pratt, McGuigan, & Katzev, 2000), which has been used
in previous studies with similar aims (Åström, Jonsson, &
Karlsson, 2017). This survey is only used to test H1 on
the consequences of involvement for developments in
political trust. Even if it is less reliable than panel data for
establishing developments over time, it makes it possi-
ble to determine whether participants also subjectively
experience the developments objectivelymeasuredwith
panel data. Furthermore, this survey makes it possible
to explore whether there are differences in the develop-
ments depending on the extent of involvement, i.e. how
many initiatives the respondents supported.
An overview of the data is provided in the Appendix
(data is available upon request to the author).
3.2. Variables
The dependent variable is political trust. The proper op-
erationalization of this concept is disputed (Zmerli &
Hooghe, 2011), but I here follow the predominant ap-
proach in previous studies and conceive political trust
as a one-dimensional phenomenon (Åström et al., 2017;
Bauer & Fatke, 2014; Dyck, 2009; Kern, 2017;). Ex-
ploratory factor analyses justify this approach since po-
litical trust is clearly one-dimensional in both surveys
(see online Appendix). Furthermore, robustness checks
show similar results for the individual trust items (see
Appendix). Accordingly, political trust is measured with
a sum index combining levels of trust in government,
political parties, politicians, and the Parliament in all
three surveys.
The main independent variable is direct-democratic
involvement in the form of using the citizens’ initiative.
In the panel data from Avoin Ministeriö, the indepen-
dent variable iswhether the respondent supported a spe-
cific citizens’ initiative in each round. The independent
variable in the other survey also takes into consideration
the extent of the involvement since the respondents indi-
cate the approximate number of initiatives signed. These
different operationalizations make it possible to draw
firmer conclusions on the impact of using the citizens’ ini-
tiative on political trust.
To examine the impact of process satisfaction on de-
velopments in political trust across rounds, a question is
used that asks respondents whether they thought Par-
liament handled the initiative in a suitable manner. Re-
spondents gave answers on a five-point scale ‘Strongly
agree’–‘Strongly disagree’ but these were recoded to a
dichotomy whereby respondents who agree are satis-
fied while those who are neutral or disagree are unsat-
isfied. This coding entails a restrictive view of satisfac-
tion, but excluding the neutral category leads to simi-
lar conclusions.
To ascertain the results, the models include control
variables that have been argued to affect political trust:
Age, gender, education, political interest and social trust
(Dalton, 2004; Hetherington, 1998; Zmerli & Hooghe,
2011). Similar control variables are used in both surveys,
although the operationalizations differ slightly (see on-
line Appendix).
3.3. Methods of Analysis
To examine H2 and H3 with panel data, a series of
growth curve models analyse developments over time.
Growth curve models are a special case of the random-
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effects model approach to analysing panel data where
developments in longitudinal data are examined (Curran,
Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010; Singer & Willett, 2003; Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). This multilevel approach
models the shape of trajectories of individual subjects
over time and how these trajectories vary randomly and
systematically due to occasion level and subject-level co-
variates (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). Compared to
traditional fixed effects models, this approach has sev-
eral advantages (Curran et al., 2010). Most importantly
for the present purposes, it is possible to include re-
spondents even when they fail to answer every wave,
although it is preferable to have several estimates over
time for all respondents (Singer & Willett, 2003, p. 148).
A fixed effects model using the xtreg procedure in Stata
showed similar substantial results.
For H1, a model examines the impact of using the cit-
izens’ initiative across rounds, while testing H2 and H3 in-
volves including a three-way interaction effect to exam-
ine whether the effects of involvement and process sat-
isfaction differ across rounds. These hypotheses are only
examined in the panel data since this makes it possible
to tie involvement to specific initiatives. Only the initia-
tive proposing gender neutralmarriage legislationwas ap-
proved, meaning H2 suggests that the effect of support-
ing should be positive for this round and negative in the
others whereas H3 predicts similar positive effects of pro-
cess satisfaction in all rounds regardless of the outcome.
4. Analysis
Table 1 shows results for H1 on the developments in po-
litical trust because of involvement.
The significant estimates for signing initiatives in the
Avoin Minsteriö survey (B = −0.016, p < 0.000) and the
kansalaisaloite.fi survey (B=−0.036, p< 0.000) both sug-
gest that using the citizens’ initiative diminished political
trust. Figure 1 shows the implications of signing for de-
velopments in trust.
Figure 1a shows that among Avoin Ministeriö users,
using the citizens’ initiative on average decreased politi-
cal trust with about 0.016 on the scale 0–1 when control-
ling for other factors. Although the effect is not partic-
ularly strong, the significant negative effect shows that
there are no signs of the expected positive effect from
involvement. The results from kansalaisaloite.fi in Fig-
ure 1b show that the cumulative effect may be substan-
tial, since the extent of involvement mattered for users
on kansalaialoite.fi. Here political trust on average de-
clined more drastically among more avid users. The re-
sults therefore clearly contradict H1 and the suggestion
that involvement enhances political trust.
Hypotheses H2 and H3 concern how outcomes and
process satisfaction affected developments in political
trust. To test these propositions among Avoin Ministeriö
users, the model in Table 2 includes a three-way inter-
action effect between involvement, process satisfaction
Table 1. Using the citizens’ initiative and developments in political trust.
Avoin Ministeriö kansalaisaloite.fi
B (SE) P B (SE) P
Supported citizens’ initiative −0.016 (0.004) 0.000 −0.036 (0.010) 0.000
Age 0.002 (0.000) 0.000 −0.003 (0.001) 0.000
Gender −0.015 (0.010) 0.120 −0.016 (0.022) 0.477
Education 0.029 (0.008) 0.000 0.039 (0.015) 0.012
Political interest 0.060 (0.013) 0.000 0.009 (0.051) 0.857
Social trust 0.135 (0.013) 0.000 0.294 (0.053) 0.000
Round (Ref: Ban Fur Farming)
Copyright legislation −0.021 (0.004) 0.000
Gender neutral marriage legislation 0.011 (0.005) 0.014
Make Swedish voluntary −0.001 (0.005) 0.746
Constant 0.237 (0.021) 0.000 0.338 (0.063) 0.000
Random effects
var(round) 0.000 (0.000)
var(cons) 0.033 (0.002)
cov(round, cons) −0.002 (0.000)
var(Residual) 0.009 (0.000)
Snijders/Boskers R2 Level 1 0.14
Snijders/Boskers R2 Level 2 0.16
ICC 0.79
N 4105/1399 395
R2 0.21
Notes: AvoinMinisteriö: Entries are coefficients (B) with robust standard errors (SE) and significance levels (P) from growth curvemodels
estimated with the xtmixed command in Stata. Kansalaisaloite.fi: Entries are coefficients (B) from linear regression analyses with robust
standard errors (SE) and significance levels (P).
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Figure 1. Effects on political trust from using the citizens’ initiative: (a) Development after supporting, (b) Perceived devel-
opment in trust.
and round to examine whether the effect of using the
citizens’ initiative differs across rounds. The expectation
in line with H2 is here that the effect of supporting the
initiative on gender-neutral marriage legislation should
differ from the other three since this was the only ini-
tiative that Parliament approved, whereas H3 suggests
that the effect of process satisfaction should be similar
across rounds.
When it comes to the impact of outcomes, there is
a significant interaction effect for the panel conducted
following the decision on the gender-neutral marriage
initiative, which means that the effect of using the citi-
zens’ initiative in this round differ from the reference cat-
egory. There are no significant interaction effects when
it comes to the impact of process satisfaction, although
the estimate for the interaction effect concerning Equal
marriage comes close (B = 0.030; p = 0.054). It is note-
worthy that the interaction effect between outcome sup-
port and process satisfaction is non-significant since this
shows that the effect of process satisfaction is indepen-
dent of whether the preferred outcome is achieved. To
see what the results entail for the impact of outcome
and process satisfaction, Figure 2 shows the differences
in developments in trust for these two sets of interac-
tion effects.
Figure 2a shows that there are clear differences in
the predicted developments depending on the outcome
of the citizens’ initiative. When Parliament rejected the
citizens’ initiatives, the users developed lower levels of
trust compared to those who did not make use of the cit-
izens’ initiative. For the initiative on gender-neutral mar-
riage legislation, which Parliament approved, those who
used the citizens’ initiative developed a higher level of
political trust compared to those who did not support
this initiative. This pattern indicates that the outcome of
the decision-making matters since using the citizens’ ini-
tiative had a positive effect when Parliament approved
the initiative. The pattern in Figure 2b for process sat-
isfaction differ strikingly since those who are satisfied
with the process experience positive developments com-
pared to the dissatisfied in all four rounds. These results
support H2 and H3 since users experience positive devel-
opments in political trust when they either achieve the
intended target or consider the process to be fair.
5. Conclusions
The results show that involvement served to further de-
crease levels of political trust among users on both Avoin
Ministeriö and kansalaialoite.fi. Those who had signed
an initiative on average experienced a decline in trust
compared to those who did not sign. Although the de-
cline in trust caused by signing a single initiative was
small, the evidence from kansalaisloite.fi suggested that
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Table 2. Outcomes of citizens’ initiatives and developments in political trust.
Avoin Ministeriö
B (SE) P
Supported citizens’ initiative (CI) −0.019 (0.009) 0.036
Process satisfaction 0.044 (0.009) 0.000
Age 0.002 (0.000) 0.000
Gender −0.012 (0.009) 0.211
Education 0.028 (0.008) 0.000
Political interest 0.058 (0.013) 0.000
Social trust 0.135 (0.013) 0.000
Round (Ref: Ban Fur Farming)
Copyright legislation −0.018 (0.008) 0.032
Gender neutral marriage legislation −0.023 (0.011) 0.028
Make Swedish voluntary −0.003 (0.008) 0.752
Supported CI # process satisfaction # round (Ref: Ban Fur Farming)
Yes # Yes # Copyright legislation 0.011 (0.025) 0.646
Yes # Yes # Gender neutral marriage −0.009 (0.021) 0.681
Yes # Yes # Make Swedish voluntary 0.030 (0.024) 0.218
Supported CI # round (Ref Ban Fur Farming)
Yes # Copyright legislation 0.005 (0.012) 0.710
Yes # Gender neutral marriage 0.041 (0.014) 0.003
Yes # Make Swedish voluntary 0.001 (0.014) 0.957
Process satisfaction # round (Ref Ban Fur Farming)
Yes # Copyright legislation 0.012 (0.014) 0.197
Yes # Gender neutral marriage 0.030 (0.016) 0.054
Yes # Make Swedish voluntary 0.002 (0.012) 0.855
Supported CI (Yes) # process satisfaction (Yes) −0.022 (0.015) 0.139
Constant 0.235 (0.021) 0.000
Random effects
var(round) 0.000 (0.000)
var(cons) 0.031 (0.002)
cov(round, cons) −0.002 (0.000)
var(Residual) 0.009 (0.000)
Snijders/Boskers R2 Level 1 0.18
Snijders/Boskers R2 Level 2 0.20
ICC 0.79
N 4103/1399
Note: Entries are coefficients (B) with robust standard errors (SE) and significance levels (P) from growth curve models estimated with
the xtmixed command in Stata.
the negative effect is cumulative, meaning that signing
more initiatives leads to a more pronounced decrease
in trust. There is therefore a risk that continuous use of
the citizens’ initiative creates a downward spiral of polit-
ical trust.
This does not bode well for the prospects of restock-
ing levels of trustwith the help of citizens’ initiatives. This
may indicate that some users had unrealistic high expec-
tations for the possibilities of determining legislative out-
comes by using the citizens’ initiative. The Finnish citi-
zens’ initiative does not make citizens the final decision-
makers but is a soft form of direct democracy that entails
an interplay between direct and representative democ-
racy (Jäske, 2017). While the introduction has empow-
ered citizens, usage does not guarantee getting the pre-
ferred outcome as losing forms part of democratic de-
cision making. This problem is clearly visible in the re-
sults for H2 and H3 concerning factors that shape devel-
opments in political trust.
For H2, outcomes clearly mattered for developments
in trust since users experienced a positive development
in political trust when Parliament approved the initia-
tive. This finding corroborates previous studies show-
ing a gap between winners and losers (Anderson et al.,
2005; Curini et al., 2012; Marien & Kern, 2017) and in-
dicates that involvement is not enough, any positive im-
pact hinges on citizens being empowered to achieve their
desired target through their involvement (Budge, 2012;
Ulbig, 2008).What alsomatters is howusers perceive the
quality of decision making (Carman, 2010; Christensen
et al., 2015; Esaiasson et al., 2012; Tyler et al., 1989). Re-
gardless of the outcome, users experienced positive de-
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Figure 2. Differences in developments in political trust depending on outcome and process satisfaction: (a) Sup-
ported#Round, (b) Satisfaction#Round.
velopments in political trust when they felt that Parlia-
ment gave the proposal due consideration. This means
that it is possible for decision-makers to generate posi-
tive developments not only by approving all initiatives,
but also by giving them serious consideration and care-
fully explaining the motivations behind the decisions to
the supporters. Hence it is possible to break any down-
ward spiral either by giving people what they want, or
at least convince them that their concerns are given ad-
equate consideration (Carman, 2010).
These findings provide several theoretical insights.
First, the results complement previous studies by es-
tablishing that involvement causes negative develop-
ments in political trust over time, thereby contradict-
ing the expectation that direct-democratic involvement
should generate positive political attitudes (Barber,
1984; Gherghina, 2016; Pateman, 1970). While the re-
sults are in line with other more negative findings (Dyck,
2009; Voigt & Blume, 2015), they are also congruentwith
Bauer and Fatke (2014), who also find that the avail-
ability of direct democracy in Switzerland is connected
to higher levels of political trust, whereas usage is con-
nected to lower levels of trust. It is therefore impor-
tant to distinguish between availability and use when
discussing how direct democracy affects political trust.
Furthermore, the relevant question may not be whether
involvement causes negative or positive developments,
but what factors shape these developments. The results
also provide new insights into this question. As noted,
outcomes and process satisfaction bothmatter and their
effects were independent of each other. This entails that
negative perceptions of the quality of decision making
was not largely an artefact of not getting the desired out-
come, as has been suggested (Arvai & Froschauer, 2010).
In the current study, the results suggest that participants
were able to distinguish between outcomes and the qual-
ity of decision-making. It is an important task for future
research to determine under what circumstances can de-
cide whether a decision-making process is fair, regard-
less of whether they achieve their preferred outcome.
Although speculative, it is worth keeping in mind that
even a negative development in political trust is not nec-
essarily bad for democracy since all forms of dissatisfac-
tion are not equal (Christensen, 2016). When negative
developments are accompanied by a simultaneous in-
crease in the sense that involvement matters and hence
increased mobilization, it may benefit democracy when
critical citizens help hold decision-makers accountable
(Åström et al., 2017).
These results comewith uncertainties. The data used
is not representative, and although findings on mecha-
nismsmay still be valid, it is unclear how pervasive it is in
the general population. Furthermore, the data only cov-
ers a single approved initiative, meaning it remains un-
clear whether the results can be generalized beyond the
specific issue of gender-neutral marriage legislation. This
topic forms part of a postmodern or postmaterial polit-
ical agenda (Inglehart, 1997). Based on the current re-
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sults, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that the
results are only valid for measures of this type, espe-
cially considering that users tend to be younger citizens
(Christensen et al., 2017) who are also more likely to sup-
port this agenda. The current analyses are also unable to
take account of whether individuals supported govern-
ment or opposition parties in the election, meaning their
attitudes toward broader political developments are un-
clear. The results are also based on early experiences
with an agenda initiative and different results may be
found when the initiative becomes an ingrained part of
the Finnish political system, or indeed in countries where
citizens’ initiatives traditionally form part of the political
system. It should also be reiterated that agenda initia-
tives constitute a particular form of soft direct democ-
racy, and these results may not be valid for other direct-
democratic mechanisms. Regardless of these uncertain-
ties, the findings indicate that although introducing citi-
zens’ initiatives can further political trust in the general
population, a positive effect on users cannot be taken
for granted.
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Appendix
Table A1. Characteristics of surveys on www.avoinministerio.fi and www.kansalaisaloite.fi.
Avoin Ministeriö Kansalaisaloite.fi
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Type Panel Panel Panel Panel Cross-sectional
Date of collection June 2013 October 2014 December 2014 March 2015 April–May 2016
Topic Ban Fur Copyright Gender-equal Voluntary All initiatives launched
Farming legislation marriage legislation Swedish on website
Contact Email to all Email to those Email to those Email to those Banner
method participants who filled in who filled in who filled in
on website Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 1
Emails sent About 10000 2147 2147 2147
Filled in survey 2147 1022 930 809 481
Valid n 1419 1022 930 809 481
Table A2. Operationalisation of variables.
Survey Avoin Ministeriö Survey Kansalaisaloite.fi
Dependent variables
Political trust Sum index coded to vary between 0–1 based Development in political trust: Sum index
on trust in government, political parties, coded 0–1 based on perceived change in
politicians, and the Parliament (each item trust in government, political parties,
scored on 0–10 scale; Cronbach’s alpha = .92). politicians, and the Parliament (each item
scored on five point Likert scale: ‘Increased a
lot’–‘Decreased a lot’; Cronbach’s alpha = .94).
Independent variables and control variables
Supported citizens’ Dichotomous: Supported specific initiative in Extent of supporting: ‘Did not support any ‘,
initiative each round: Yes (1)/No or do not remember (0). ‘Supported 1–2’, ‘Supported 3–5’, ‘Supported
6–10’, ‘Supported more than 10’. Coded to
vary between 0–1.
Process satisfaction ‘Parliament handled the citizens’ initiative in a N/A
suitable manner’, Likert scale with 5 categories:
‘Agree completely–Completely disagree’: coded
dichotomous Agree completely + Agree= 1/
Neutral, Disagree and Disagree completely = 0.
Age Age in years (2013–year of birth). Age in years (2016–year of birth).
Gender Dichotomy, Male = 1. Dichotomy, Female = 0, Male = 1.
Education Highest level of educational attainment, Highest level of educational attainment,
4 categories. Coded to vary between 0–1 4 categories. Coded to vary between 0–1
(Highest level of education attainment). (Highest level of education attainment).
Political interest Level of political interest, 4-point scale ‘Not Level of political interest, 4-point scale ‘Not
interested at all’–‘Very interested’. Coded to interested at all’–‘Very interested’. Coded to
vary between 0–1 (High interest). vary between 0–1 (High interest).
Social trust ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be Perceived change in trust in other people
too careful’, scale 0–10, recoded to vary because of involvement in citizens’ initiative,
between 0–1 (Highest level of social trust). answer on five-point Likert scale: ‘Increased a
lot’–‘Decreased a lot’; coded to vary between
0–1 (Increased a lot).
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Survey: Avoin Ministeriö n mean SD Min Max
TOTAL
Political trust 4158 0.47 0.21 0.00 0.98
Supported citizens’ initiative 4180 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Process satisfaction 4177 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Age 4178 39.02 13.09 17 80
Gender (1 =male) 4136 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Education 4173 1.68 0.64 0.00 3.00
Political interest 4175 0.76 0.24 0.00 1.00
Social trust 4180 0.67 0.23 0.00 1.00
WAVE 1 (Ban Fur Farming)
Political trust 1397 0.47 0.21 0.00 0.93
Supported citizens’ initiative 1419 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Process satisfaction 1416 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Age 1418 38.49 12.93 17 80
Gender (1 =male) 1401 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
Education 1417 1.67 0.64 0.00 3.00
Political interest 1414 0.75 0.24 0.00 1.00
Social trust 1419 0.64 0.24 0.00 1.00
WAVE 2 (Copyright legislation)
Political trust 1022 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.88
Supported citizens’ initiative 1022 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00
Process satisfaction 1022 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Age 1022 38.50 12.57 17 80
Gender (1 =male) 1013 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Education 1020 1.70 0.64 0.00 3.00
Political interest 1022 0.74 0.24 0.00 1.00
Social trust 1022 0.67 0.23 0.00 1.00
WAVE 3 (Gender neutral marriage legislation)
Political trust 930 0.49 0.20 0.00 0.98
Supported citizens’ initiative 930 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
Process satisfaction 930 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age 930 39.02 13.28 17 80
Gender (1 =male) 923 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
Education 929 1.68 0.64 0.00 3.00
Political interest 930 0.76 0.23 0.00 1.00
Social trust 930 0.69 0.23 0.00 1.00
WAVE 4 (Make Swedish voluntary)
Political trust 809 0.48 0.20 0.00 0.90
Supported citizens’ initiative 809 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Process satisfaction 809 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Age 808 40.62 13.70 17 80
Gender (1 =male) 799 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Education 807 1.69 0.65 0.00 3.00
Political interest 809 0.77 0.23 0.00 1.00
Social trust 809 0.68 0.23 0.00 1.00
Survey: Kansalaisaloite.fi n mean SD Min Max
Perceived development in political trust 475 0.33 0.23 0.00 1.00
Supported citizens’ initiative 477 0.54 0.30 0.00 1.00
Age 436 41.91 15.85 18 86
Gender (1 =male) 449 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Education 478 1.49 0.74 0.00 3.00
Political interest 472 0.75 0.22 0.00 1.00
Social trust 474 0.57 0.22 0.00 1.00
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Table A4. Factor analyses of political trust items.
Survey: Avoin Ministeriö Survey: Kansalaistaloite.fi
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Combined Change pol. trust
Trust parliament 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Trust politicians 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.96
Trust political parties 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.92
Trust government 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.91
Eigenvalue 3.24 3.28 3.26 3.23 3.26 3.43
Eigenvalue Factor 2 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.26
Cronbach’s alpha 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94
Observations 1393 1022 930 809 4154 475
Notes: Entries are unrotated factor loadings from principal-component factor analyses using the Principal Component Factoring (PCF)
procedure in Stata. Substantially identical results were obtained using the Principal Factor method (FP), the Iterated Principal Factor
method (IPF) and Maximum-Likelihood factor method (ml). Since a one-dimensional solution under all circumstances appear optimal,
there is no need for rotation to interpret the results.
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Table A5. Regression analyses of individual trust items.
Avoin Ministeriö Trust parliament Trust politicians Trust political parties Trust government
B (SE) P B (SE) P B (SE) P B (SE) P
Supported citizens’ initiative −0.013 (0.005) 0.011 −0.013 (0.005) 0.008 −0.011 (0.005) 0.030 −0.011 (0.005) 0.043
Age 0.002 (0.000) 0.000 0.001 (0.000) 0.088 0.001 (0.000) 0.027 0.002 (0.000) 0.000
Gender −0.007 (0.011) 0.492 −0.014 (0.010) 0.158 −0.046 (0.011) 0.000 −0.038 (0.012) 0.002
Education 0.044 (0.008) 0.000 0.034 (0.009) 0.000 0.027 (0.008) 0.000 0.046 (0.009) 0.000
Political interest 0.065 (0.016) 0.000 0.090 (0.015) 0.000 0.101 (0.016) 0.000 −0.020 (0.017) 0.226
Social trust 0.165 (0.017) 0.000 0.154 (0.015) 0.000 0.144 (0.016) 0.000 0.167 (0.017) 0.000
Round (Ref: Ban Fur Farming)
Copyright legislation −0.042 (0.006) 0.000 −0.018 (0.005) 0.001 −0.015 (0.006) 0.007 −0.028 (0.006) 0.000
Gender neutral marriage legislation −0.001 (0.006) 0.820 0.013 (0.006) 0.018 0.014 (0.006) 0.014 0.005 (0.006) 0.422
Make Swedish voluntary −0.025 (0.006) 0.000 0.000 (0.006) 0.943 0.002 (0.006) 0.775 −0.016 (0.007) 0.014
Constant 0.224 (0.025) 0.000 0.174 (0.023) 0.000 0.176 (0.024) 0.000 0.239 (0.026) 0.000
Random effects
var(round) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
var(cons) 0.038 (0.003) 0.034 (0.002) 0.041 (0.003) 0.052 (0.003)
cov(round, cons) −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.003 (0.001) −0.003 (0.001)
var(Residual) 0.015 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001)
Snijders/Boskers R2 level 1 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11
Snijders/Boskers R2 Level 2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.13
ICC 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.76
N 1399/4121 1399/4120 1399/4114 1399/4111
Kansalaisaloite.fi Trust parliament Trust politicians Trust political parties Trust government
B (SE) P B (SE) P B (SE) P B (SE) P
Supported citizens’ initiative −0.040 (0.011) 0.000 −0.033 (0.011) 0.002 −0.036 (0.010) 0.001 −0.035 (0.010) 0.001
Age −0.003 (0.001) 0.000 −0.003 (0.001) 0.000 −0.004 (0.001) 0.000 −0.003 (0.001) 0.000
Gender −0.027 (0.026) 0.292 −0.005 (0.024) 0.828 −0.040 (0.023) 0.084 0.010 (0.024) 0.675
Education 0.047 (0.018) 0.010 0.040 (0.017) 0.017 0.028 (0.016) 0.090 0.041 (0.017) 0.015
Political interest 0.010 (0.057) 0.859 0.017 (0.055) 0.762 0.080 (0.052) 0.125 −0.078 (0.055) 0.153
Social trust 0.320 (0.060) 0.000 0.317 (0.057) 0.000 0.319 (0.057) 0.000 0.218 (0.058) 0.000
Constant 0.357 (0.072) 0.000 0.283 (0.070) 0.000 0.315 (0.065) 0.000 0.407 (0.069) 0.000
N 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.23
R2 397 395 397 397
Notes: Avoin Ministeriö: Entries are coefficients (B) with robust standard errors (SE) and significance levels (P) from growth curve models estimated with the xtmixed command in Stata. Kansalaisaloite.fi:
Entries are coefficients (B) from linear regression analyses with robust standard errors (SE) and significance levels (P).
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